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Indefinite Linear Quadratic Mean Field Social
Control Problems with Multiplicative Noise
Bingchang Wang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Huanshui Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper studies uniform stabilization and social
optimality for linear quadratic (LQ) mean field control problems
with multiplicative noise, where agents are coupled via dynamics
and individual costs. The state and control weights in cost
functionals are not limited to be positive semi-definite. This leads
to an indefinite LQ mean field control problem, which may still
be well-posed due to deep nature of multiplicative noise. We first
obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations
(FBSDEs) from variational analysis, and construct a feedback
control by decoupling the FBSDEs. By using solutions to two
Riccati equations, we design a set of decentralized control laws,
which is further shown to be asymptotically social optimal. Some
equivalent conditions are given for uniform stabilization of the
systems with the help of linear matrix inequalities. A numerical
example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
control laws.
Index Terms—Mean field game, stabilization control, varia-
tional analysis, forward-backward stochastic differential equa-
tion, generalized Riccati equation
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and motivation
The topic of mean field games and control has drawn
increasing attention in many disciplines including system con-
trol, applied mathematics and economics [7], [8], [14]. A mean
field game involves a very large number of small interacting
players. While the influence of each player is negligible, the
impact of the overall population is significant. By combining
mean field approximations and individual best response, the
dimensionality difficulty can be overcome. Mean field games
and control have found wide applications, including smart
grids [29], [10], finance, economics [15], [9], [40], [22], and
social networks [5], etc.
Depending on the state-cost setup of a mean field game,
it can be classified into linear-quadratic (LQ) type and more
general nonlinear type. By now, the LQ type has been com-
monly adopted in mean field studies because of its analytical
tractability and close connection to practical applications. In
this aspect, some relevant works include [19], [27], [42], [6],
[30]. Huang et al. developed the Nash certainty equivalence
(NCE) based on the fixed-point method and designed an ǫ-
Nash equilibrium for LQ games with discount costs [19].
The NCE approach was then applied to the (general) cases
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with stochastic ergodic costs [27] and with Markov jump
parameters [42], respectively. The works [11], [6] employed
the adjoint equation approach and the fixed-point theorem to
obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium
strategy over a finite horizon. For other aspects of mean field
games, readers are referred to [21], [25], [11] for nonlinear
mean field games, [47] for oblivious equilibrium in dynamic
games, [18], [43], [44] for mean field games with major
players, [17], [30] for robust mean field games.
Apart from noncooperative games, team optimization forms
another research branch for studying cooperative behavior
among multiple decision makers. In particular, social optima
in mean field models with weak coupling have drawn more
research interests. By social optimization, all players in a
large population system (endowed with some weak-coupling
structure in either cost or dynamics) will cooperate to min-
imize a common social cost–the sum of individual costs.
Accordingly, we formulate a type of team decision problem
[32]. Different from Nash games, all the agents in a team
problem are cooperative and share the same cost functional,
although they may have different information sets [16]. Huang
et al. considered social optima in mean field LQ control, and
provided an asymptotic team-optimal solution [20]. Wang and
Zhang [45] investigated a mean field social optimal problem
where the Markov jump parameter appears as a common
source of randomness. For further literature on social control,
for instance, see [23] for social optima in mixed games, [3]
for team-optimal control with finite population and partial
information, and [36] for the dynamic collective choice by
finding a social optimum.
Concerned with mean field games and control for stochastic
systems, most existing literature focused on the case with
additive noise (i.e., the intensity of noise is independent of
the state). Sometimes, such kind of noise is not sufficient to
depict practical situations. Alternatively, multiplicative noise is
another realistic description for stochastic disturbance. Mean
field control with multiplicative noise has attracted much at-
tention due to its wide applications in engineering, economics,
and etc [12], [22], [41], [46]. This paper investigates uniform
stabilization and social optimality for mean field LQ control
systems with multiplicative noises, where subsystems are
coupled via both dynamics and individual costs. The intensities
of multiplicative noises depends on both system states and
control inputs. The state weight Q and control weight R in
the cost functional are not limited to be positive semi-definite.
In fact, an indefinite Q or R may naturally occur in a wide
class of practical problems, including production adjustment
[40], uncertain systems [17], and portfolio selection [53].
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This problem leads to generalized Riccati equations, which
is essentially different from the classical Riccati equation due
to indefinite weights and multiplicative noise appearing in the
problem.
B. Challenge and main contributions
Most previous results on mean field games and control were
given by virtue of the fixed-point analysis [19], [27], [20], [45],
[12]. However, the fixed-point assumption may be not easy to
tackle, particularly for high-dimensional systems. In this paper,
we solve the problem by directly decoupling high-dimensional
forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs)
instead of fixed-point analysis. This procedure shares a similar
philosophy with the direct method [24], [25]. In recent years,
some progress for optimal LQ control has been made by
tackling FBSDEs [48], [11], [51], [6], [31], [39], [33].
For the finite-horizon mean field LQ control problem, we
first obtain a set of FBSDEs by examining the social cost
variation, and give a centralized feedback control by decou-
pling the FBSDEs. Applying mean field approximations, we
design decentralized control laws. By exploiting the uniform
convexity property of the optimal control problem, we further
show that the decentralized controls have asymptotic social
optimality. For the infinite-horizon case, we construct a set of
decentralized control laws by using solutions of two Riccati
equations, and further show decentralized controls are asymp-
totically social optimal. Some equivalent conditions are further
given for uniform stabilization of all the subsystems with the
help of linear matrix inequalities.
For the mean field control systems with multiplicative noise,
it is more difficult to show the uniform stabilization of all
the subsystems than the case with additive noise. Due to the
appearance of multiplicative noise, the approximation error
between population state average xˆ(N) and aggregate effect x¯
relies on the states of all the agents while the mean square of
the state xˆi conversely depends on the approximation error.
Thus, we need to analyze jointly the approximation error and
states of all the agents. By tackling the corresponding integral
inequalities, we obtain that all the subsystems are uniformly
stabilizable and the mean field approximation is consistent.
Moreover, since the weights Q and R in the cost functional
are indefinite, the prior boundedness of the state is not implied
directly by the finiteness of the cost, which brings about
extra difficulty to show the social optimality of decentralized
control. Here we first obtain the prior upper bounds of states
and controls by exploiting the uniform convexity property of
the problem, and further prove that decentralized strategies
have asymptotic social optimality by perturbation analysis.
Main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
• For the finite-horizon problem, we first obtain necessary
and sufficient existence conditions of centralized optimal
control based on FBSDEs, and then design a feedback-
type decentralized control by decoupling FBSDEs and
applying mean field approximations.
• By exploiting the uniform convexity of the problem, the
decentralized control laws are shown to have asymptotic
social optimality.
• The necessary and sufficient conditions are given for
uniform stabilization of the systems by virtue of the
system’s observability and linear matrix inequalities.
• An explicit expression of the asymptotic average social
cost is given in terms of the solutions of two Riccati
equations.
C. Organization and notation
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the
indefinite LQ mean field social control problem is formulated.
In Section III, we first construct a set of decentralized control
laws for the finite-horizon case, and then show its asymptotic
social optimality. In Section IV, we design asymptotically
optimal control for the infinite-horizon case and further give
some equivalent conditions of uniform stabilization. In Section
V, we give the value of asymptotic average optimal social cost.
In Section VI, a numerical example is provided to show the
effectiveness of the proposed controls. Section VII concludes
the paper.
The following notation will be used throughout this paper.
Denote by ‖ · ‖ the Euclidean vector norm or matrix spectral
norm, and ⊗ the Kronecker product. For a vector z and a
matrix Q, ‖z‖2Q = zTQz; Q > 0 (Q ≥ 0) means that the
matrix Q is positive definite (positive semi-definite). Q† is the
Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse1 of the matrix Q,R(Q) denotes
the range of a matrix (or an operator)Q, and ker(Q) is the ker-
nel of Q. For two vectors x, y, 〈x, y〉 = xT y. L2([0,∞),Rk)
is given by {f : [0,∞) → Rk| ∫∞
0
‖f(t)‖2dt < ∞}.
L2F(0, T ;R
k) is the space of all Ft-adapted Rk-valued pro-
cesses x(·) such that E ∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt < ∞. For convenience
of presentation, we use c, c1, c2, · · · to denote generic positive
constants, which may vary from place to place.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a large population systems with N agents. Agent
i evolves by the following stochastic differential equation:
dxi(t) = [Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Gx
(N)(t)]dt
+ [Cxi(t) +Dui(t)]dWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (1)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ Rr are the state and input of the ith
agent.A,B,G,C,D are constant matrices with appropriate di-
mensions. x(N)(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj(t). {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are
a sequence of independent 1-dimensional Brownian motions
on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P).
The cost functional of agent i is given by
Ji(u) =E
∫ ∞
0
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt,
(2)
where Q,R,Γ are constant matrices with appropriate dimen-
sions. Q and R are symmetric (generally indefinite). Denote
u = {u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uN}. The decentralized control set is
1Q† is a unique matrix satisfying QQ†Q = Q†, Q†QQ† =
Q, (Q†Q)T = Q†Q, and (QQ†)T = QQ†.
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given by
Ud =
{
(u1, · · · , uN )
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to
σ(xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t),E
∫ ∞
0
‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞, ∀i
}
.
For comparison, define the centralized control set as
Uc =
{
(u1, · · · , uN )
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to Ft,
E
∫ ∞
0
‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞, ∀i
}
,
where Ft ∆= σ{
⋃N
i=1 F it} and F it = σ(xi(0),Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤
t), i = 1, · · · , N .
In this paper, we mainly study the following problem.
(P0) Seek a set of decentralized control laws to optimize
social cost for the system (1)-(2), i.e., infu∈Ud Jsoc(u), where
Jsoc(u) =
N∑
i=1
Ji(u).
We first make the assumption on the initial values of agents’
states.
A1) xi(0), i = 1, ..., N are mutually independent and have
the same mathematical expectation. xi(0) = xi0, Exi(0) =
x¯0, i = 1, · · · , N . There exists a constant c0 (independent
of N ) such that max1≤i≤N E‖xi(0)‖2 < c0. Furthermore,
{xi(0), i = 1, ..., N} and {Wi, i = 1, ..., N} are independent
of each other.
Remark 2.1: Since the weights Q and R are indefinite,
Problem (P0) is called an indefinite LQ mean field social
control problem. Due to the indefiniteness of Q and R, the
convexity may be lost, and the problem may have no solutions.
Thus, we need to discuss the convexity of Problem (P0), which
is related to the generalized Riccati equation.
To facilitate the discussion for the convexity of Problem
(P0), we write the problem in a high-dimensional form.
Let x = (xT1 , · · · , xTN )T , u = (uT1 , · · · , uTN )T ,
1 = (1, · · · , 1)T , σi = (0, · · · , 0, σT , 0, · · · , 0)T ,
Aˇ = diag(A, · · · , A) + 1N (11T ⊗ G), B =
diag(B, · · · , B), Ci = diag(0, · · · , 0, C, 0, · · · , 0),
Di = diag(0, · · · , 0, D, 0, · · · , 0), and R = diag(R, · · · , R).
With the above notations, the dynamics of all agents can be
written in the more compact form:
dx(t) =
[
Aˇx(t) + Bu(t) + 1⊗ f(t)]dt
+
N∑
i=1
[Cix(t) + Diu(t) + σi(t)]dWi(t).
Also, denote {
QΓ
∆
= ΓTQ +QΓ− ΓTQΓ
η¯
∆
= Qη − ΓTQη
By rearranging the integrand of Jsoc, we have
Jsoc =E
∫ ∞
0
(
‖x(t)‖2
Q¯
− 2(1⊗ η¯(t))T x(t)
+N‖η(t)‖2 + ‖u(t)‖2R
)
dt,
(3)
where Q¯ = (Q¯ij) is given by
Q¯ii = Q−QΓ/N, Q¯ij = −QΓ/N, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N.
Remark 2.2: Hereafter, we may exchange the usage of no-
tation u = (u1, · · · , uN) ∈ Rr×N and u = (uT1 , · · · , uTN )T ∈
R
rN . Both notations represent the control laws among all
agents, but only differ in their formations.
For the convenience of design, we first consider the
following finite-horizon problem in next section:
(P1) inf
u∈L2F (0,T ;Rnr)
JFsoc(u),
where JFsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1 J
F
i (u) and
JFi (u) =E
∫ T
0
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η(t)∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt
+ E‖xi(T )− Γ0x(N)(T )− η0‖2H .
(4)
III. MEAN FIELD LQ SOCIAL CONTROL OVER A FINITE
HORIZON
We now provide some equivalent conditions for the convex-
ity of Problem (P1). Denote
HΓ0
∆
= ΓT0H +HΓ0 − ΓT0HΓ0, η¯0 ∆= Hη0 − ΓT0Hη0.
Definition 3.1: [50] Problem (P1) is convex, if for any 0 <
λ < 1 and u, v ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rnr),
JFsoc(λu + (1− λ)v) ≤ λJFsoc(u) + (1− λ)JFsoc(v).
Particularly, (P1) is uniformly convex, if the following further
holds:
JFsoc(λu + (1− λ)v) ≤λJFsoc(u) + (1− λ)JFsoc(v)
− λ(1− λ)E
∫ T
0
‖u− v‖2dt.
Proposition 3.1: Problem (P1) is convex in u if and only
if for any ui ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rr), i = 1, · · · , N ,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∥∥yi − Γy(N)∥∥2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E‖yi(T )− Γ0y(N)(T )‖2H ≥ 0,
where y(N) =
∑N
j=1 yj/N and yi satisfies
dyi = (Ayi +Gy
(N) +Bui)dt+ (Cyi +Dui)dWi,
yi(0) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N.
(5)
Proof. The proof is similar to [17], [28]. 
Proposition 3.2: The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Problem (P1) is uniformly convex in u.
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(ii) For any ui ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rr), i = 1, · · · , N , there exists
a constant γ > 0 (independent of ui, i = 1, · · · , N ) such that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∥∥yi − Γy(N)∥∥2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E‖yi(T )− Γ0y(N)(T )‖2H ≥ γ
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
‖ui‖2dt.
(iii) The equation
P˙+ Aˇ
T
P+ PAˇ+
N∑
i=1
CTi PCi + Q¯ −
(
BTP+
N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)T
×Υ†
(
BTP+
N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)
= 0, P(T ) = H¯
(6)
admits a solution such that Υ = R +
∑N
i=1 D
T
i PDi ≥ 0 and
R
(
BTP+
∑N
i=1 D
T
i PCi
)
⊆ R(Υ), where H¯ = (H¯ij) is given
by H¯ii = H −HΓ0/N, H¯ij = −HΓ0/N, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N.
Proof. (i)⇔(ii) is implied from [17], [28]. (i)⇔(iii) is given
by Theorem 4.5 of [37]. 
We now obtain some necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of centralized optimal control of (P1).
Theorem 3.1: Under A1), the following hold:
(i) Problem (P1) has a set of optimal control laws if and
only if Problem (P1) is convex in u and the following equation
system admits a set of solutions (xi, pi, β
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N):


dxi =
(
Axi +Bui +Gx
(N) + f
)
dt
+ (Cxi +Dui + σ)dWi,
dpi =−
(
AT pi + C
Tβii +G
T p(N)
)
dt
− (Qxi −QΓx(N) − η¯)dt+ N∑
j=1
βji dWj ,
xi(0) = xi0, pi(T ) = Hxi −HΓ0x(N) − η¯0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(7)
where p(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 pi, and the optimal control ui, 1 ≤ i ≤
N satisfies the stationary condition
Rui +B
T pi +D
Tβii = 0. (8)
(ii) If Problem (P1) is uniformly convex, then (P1) admits
a set of optimal control laws.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
To ensure the solvability of the problem (P1), we assume
A2) Problem (P1) is uniformly convex in u.
We now use the idea inspired by [49], [51], [33] to decouple
the FBSDE (7). Let pi = PNxi + KNx
(N) + sN . It follows
from (7) that


dx(N) =
[
(A+G)x(N) +Bu(N) + f
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Cxi +Dui + σ)dWi,
dp(N) =−
[
(A+G)T p(N) + (Q −QΓ)x(N) − η¯
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
CTβii
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βji dWj ,
x(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0, p
(N)(T ) = (H −HΓ0)x(N) − η¯0.
(9)
Then by (7), (9) and Itoˆ’s formula,
dpi =P˙Nxi + PN
[(
Axi +Bui +Gx
(N) + f
)
dt
+ (Cxi +Dui + σ)dWi
]
+ (s˙N + K˙Nx
(N))dt
+KN
{[
(A+G)x(N) +Bu(N) + f
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Cxj +Duj + σ)dWj
}
= − [AT (PNxi +KNx(N) + sN )
+GT ((PN +KN )x
(N) + sN )
+ CTβii +Qxi −QΓx(N) − η¯
]
dt+
N∑
j=1
βji dWj . (10)
This implies that βii = (PN +
1
NKN )(Cxi +Dui + σ), and
βji =
1
NKN(Cxj +Duj + σ), j 6= i. From (8),
Rui +B
T (PNxi +KNx
(N) + sN )
+DT (PN +
1
N
KN )(Cxi +Dui + σ) = 0. (11)
Let ΥN
∆
= R +DT
(
PN +
KN
N
)
D. If (11) admits a solution,
then the optimal control can be given by
ui =−Υ†N
[(
BTPN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)
xi
+BTKNx
(N) +BT sN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
σ
]
. (12)
This together with (10) gives
P˙N +A
TPN + PNA+ C
T (PN +
KN
N
)C +Q
−
(
BTPN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)T
Υ†N
×
(
BTPN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)
= 0, PN (T ) = H, (13)
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K˙N + (A+G)
TKN +KN(A+G)−KNBΥ†NBTKN
−
(
BTPN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)T
Υ†NB
TKN +G
TPN
+ PNG−KNBΥ†N
(
BTPN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)
−QΓ = 0, KN(T ) = −HΓ0 , (14)
s˙N +
[
A+G−BΥ†N
(
BT (PN +KN)
+DT
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)]T
sN + (PN +KN)f − η¯
+
[
C −DΥ†N
(
B(PN +KN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)]T
× (PN + 1
N
KN
)
σ = 0, sN (T ) = −η¯0. (15)
From the discussion with Theorem 3.1, the below result
follows.
Proposition 3.3: Assume that A1)-A2) hold. If (13)-(15)
admit solutions such that
R
(
BTPN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
C
)
∪R(BTKN) ⊆ R(ΥN ),
BT sN +D
T
(
PN +
KN
N
)
σ ∈ R(ΥN ), ΥN ≥ 0,
then Problem (P1) has an optimal control given by (12).
Let P,K, s satisfy
P˙ +ATP + PA+ CTPC +Q− (BTP +DTPC)T
×Υ†(BTP +DTPC) = 0, P (T ) = H, (16)
K˙ + (A+G)TK +K(A+G) +GTP + PG
− (BTP +DTPC)TΥ†BTK −KBΥ†(BTP +DTPC)
−KBΥ†BTK −QΓ = 0, K(T ) = −HΓ0 , (17)
s˙+
[
A+G−BΥ†(BT (P +K) +DTPC)]T s
+ (P +K)f +
[
C −DΥ†(B(P +K) +DTPC)]TPσ
− η¯ = 0, s(T ) = −η¯0, (18)
where Υ
∆
= R+DTPD. For further analysis, we assume
A3) (16)-(18) have solutions such that Υ ≥ 0, and
R
(
BTP +DTPC
)
∪R(BTK) ⊆ R(Υ),
BT s+DTPσ ∈ R(Υ). (19)
Remark 3.1: If (16)-(18) has a solution, then by following
the argument in Theorem 4 of [24], we obtain that (13)-(15)
admits a solution for all sufficiently large N , and
sup
0≤t≤T
(‖PN − P‖+ ‖KN −K‖+ ‖sN − s‖) = o(1).
As an approximation to x(N) in (9), we obtain
dx¯
dt
=(A+G)x¯ −BΥ†[BT (P +K) +DTPC]x¯
−BΥ†(BT s+DTPσ) + f, x¯(0) = x¯0. (20)
Then, by Proposition 3.3, the decentralized control law for
agent i can be taken as
uˆi(t) =− Υ†(t)
[
(BTP (t) +DTP (t)C)xi(t)
+ BTK(t)x¯(t) +BT s(t) +DTP (t)σ(t)
]
, (21)
where P,K , s and x¯ are determined by (16)-(20).
Remark 3.2: In previous works [20], [45], the mean field
term x(N) in cost functions is first substituted by a deter-
ministic function x¯. By solving an optimal tracking problem
subject to consistency requirements, a fixed-point equation of
x¯ is obtained. The decentralized control is constructed by
handling the fixed-point equation. Here, we first obtain the
centralized solution by variational analysis, and then design
decentralized control laws by tackling FBSDEs with mean
field approximations. Note that in this case s and x¯ are fully
decoupled and no fixed-point equation is needed. In both
routes, mean field approximations are applied in solving the
social control problem, but the timings are different. In [20],
[45], mean field approximations are applied in the first step of
decentralized control design. On the contrary, we here apply
mean field approximations in the last step of control design.
Remark 3.3: By the local Lipschitz continuous property
of the quadratic function, (16)-(17) must admit a unique local
solution in a small time duration [T0, T ]. The global existence
of the solution for t ∈ [0, T ] can be referred to [1]. Particularly,
if Q ≥ 0 and R > 0, then (16)-(17) admits solutions such that
Υ > 0. Indeed, letting Π = P +K , Π satisfies the equation
Π˙ + (A+G)TΠ+Π(A+G)
− (BTΠ+DTPC)TΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)
+ CTPC + (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) = 0, Π(T ) = 0. (22)
By [49], if Q ≥ 0 and R > 0, then (16) and (22) admit
solutions such that Υ > 0, which implies (16)-(17) admit a
solution, respectively. Besides, from [37], the solvability of
(16)-(17) is equivalent to the uniform convexity of two optimal
control problems.
Example 3.1: Consider a scalar system, where A = C =
0, B = D = 1, R = r < 0, Q = −2r,H = 1. In this case, the
Riccati equation (16) may be written as
P˙ (t)− 2r − P
2(t)
P (t) + r
= 0, P (T ) = 1.
Denote y(t) = P (T − t) + r. Then we have
y˙(t) = −y
2(t) + r2
y(t)
, y(0) = 1.
This leads to y2(t) = e−2t(1 + r2) − r2, which gives
P (t) =
√
e−2(T−t)(1 + r2)− r2−r.When 0 < T ≤ Tmax =
1
2 ln
1+r2
r2 , P (t) is well defined. Note (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) ≥ 0
and Υ = r + P > 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Then (22) has a solution,
which implies (17) admits a solution for 0 < T ≤ Tmax.
Example 3.2: Consider an n-dimensional system, where
A = C = 0, B = D = I, R < 0, Q = −2R,H = hI ≥ 0. In
this case, the Riccati equation (16) may be written as
P˙ (t)− 2R− P (t)(P (t) +R)−1P (t) = 0, P (T ) = hI.
Denote Y (t) = P (T − t) +R. Then we have
Y˙ (t) = −Y (t)−RY −1(t)R, Y (0) = hI.
This leads to
d[Y R−1Y ]
dt
= −2Y (t)R−1Y (t)− 2R,
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Thus, Y (t) =
√
e−2t(h2I +R2)−R2, which gives P (t) =√
e−2(T−t)(h2I +R2)−R2−R. Denote Tˆ = 12 ln[λmin(I+
h2R−2)], where λmin(I + h2R−2) is the minimal eigenvalue
of I + h2R−2. When 0 < T ≤ Tˆ , (16) and (17) admit a
solution, respectively.
After the decentralized control laws (21) is applied, we have
the following closed-loop system
dxˆi =
[
A¯xˆi −BΥ†(BT (Kx¯+ s) +DTPσ) +Gxˆ(N) + f
]
dt
+ [C¯xˆi −DΥ†(BT (Kx¯+ s) +DTPσ) + σ]dWi,
(23)
where A¯
∆
= A − BΥ†(BTP + DTPC), and C¯ ∆= C −
DΥ†(BTP +DTPC).
We now state asymptotic optimality of decentralized control.
Theorem 3.2: Let A1)-A3) hold. Then for Problem (P1),
the set of decentralized control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} given by
(21) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,
∣∣∣ 1
N
JFsoc(uˆ)−
1
N
inf
u∈L2
F
(0,T ;Rnr)
JFsoc(u)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Remark 3.4: The works [20], [41] considered the above
mean field model with positive (semi-) definite Q and R by
the fixed point approach. To achieve asymptotic optimality, an
additional condition is needed, like well-posedness of a fixed
point equation, which is not easy to verify. Note that in the
case Q ≥ 0 and R > 0, by Proposition 3.2 and Remark
3.3, assumptions A1)-A3) hold necessarily. Hence, we get
rid of the fixed point condition thoroughly. On other hand,
for the social control with multiplicative noise, the tackling
process by person-by-person optimality is more complicated.
In [34], authors first constructed a new auxiliary system by
twice duality and then derived a consistency condition system,
which is a mean field FBSDE with embedding representation.
IV. MEAN FIELD LQ SOCIAL CONTROL OVER AN INFINITE
HORIZON
In this section, we consider the infinite-horizon problem.
Based on the similar discussion and analysis in Section III,
we may design the following decentralized control laws for
Problem (P0):
uˆi(t) =−Υ†
[
(BTP +DTPC)xi(t) +B
T (Π− P )x¯(t)
+BT s(t) +DTPσ(t)
]
, i = 1, · · · , N,
(24)
where Υ = R+DTPD, P and Π are determined by
ATP + PA+ CTPC − (BTP +DTPC)T
×Υ†(BTP +DTPC)+Q = 0, (25)
(A+G)TΠ+Π(A+G)− (BTΠ+DTPC)T
×Υ†(BTΠ+DTPC)+ CTPC +Q−QΓ = 0, (26)
and s, x¯ ∈ L2([0,∞),Rn) are determined by
ds
dt
+
[
A+G−BΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)]T s+Πf
+
[
C −DΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)]TPσ − η¯ = 0, (27)
dx¯
dt
=
[
A+G−BΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)]x¯
−BΥ†(BT s+DTPσ) + f, x¯(0) = x¯0. (28)
Here the existence conditions of P,Π, s and x¯ are to be
ensured later.
A. Uniform stabilization of subsystems
For further analysis, we first introduce some definitions.
Consider the following system
dy(t) = (Ay(t) +Bu(t))dt+ (Cy(t) +Du(t))dW (t),
(29)
z(t) = Fy(t), (30)
where y(t) ∈ Rn, and W (t) is a 1-dimensional Brownian
motion.
Definition 4.1: The system (29) with u = 0 (or simply
[A,C]) is said to be mean-square stable, if for any initial value
y(0), limt→∞ E[yT (t)y(t)] = 0.
Definition 4.2: The system (29) (or simply [A,B;C,D])
is said to be stabilizable (in the mean-square sense), if there
exists a control law u(t) = Ky(t) such that for any initial
y(0) ∈ Rn, the closed-loop system dy(t) = (A+BK)y(t)dt+
(C+DK)y(t)dW (t) is mean-square stable. In this case u(t) is
called a stabilizer. If C = D = 0, then the system, abbreviated
as (A,B), is stabilizable.
Definition 4.3: ([52]) The system (29)-(30) (or simply
[A,C;F ]) is said to be exactly observable, if there exists
a T0 ≥ 0 such that for any T > T0, z(t) = 0, u(t) =
0, a.s., 0 ≤ t ≤ T implies y(0) = 0. If C = 0, then the
system, abbreviated as (A,F ), is observable.
Definition 4.4: ([52]) The system (29)-(30) (or simply
[A,C;F ]) is said to be exactly detectable, if there exists
a T0 ≥ 0 such that for any T > T0, z(t) = 0, u(t) =
0, a.s., 0 ≤ t ≤ T implies limt→∞ E[yT (t)y(t)] = 0.
Some basic assumptions are listed for reference:
A4) The system [A,B;C,D] is stabilizable, and the system
(A+G,B) is stabilizable.
A5) S1 =
{
P¯ = P¯T : H(P¯ ) ≥ 0, ker(RP¯ ) ⊆ ker(B) ∩
ker(D), [A,C,Q
1/2
P¯
] is exactly detectable
} 6= ∅, S2 = {Π¯ =
Π¯T :M(Π¯) ≥ 0, [A+G,Q1/2
Π¯
] is detectable
} 6= ∅, where
H(P¯ ) =
[
QP¯ P¯B + C
T P¯D
BT P¯ +DT P¯C RP¯
]
,
M(Π¯) =
[
QΠ¯ Π¯B + C
TPD
BT Π¯ +DTPC RP¯
]
,
with
QP¯ = A
T P¯ + P¯A+ CT P¯C +Q,
RP¯ = R+D
T P¯D,
QΠ¯ = (A+G)
T Π¯ + Π¯(A+G) + CTPC +Q−QΓ.
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Remark 4.1: Assumption A5) plays a role of the de-
tectablity condition for indefinite LQ control. See more details
for verification criteria of stabiliability and exact detectability
in [35], [52].
Lemma 4.1: Under A4)-A5), the following holds:
(i) (25) admits a unique solution P such that Υ ≥ 0 and
[A¯, C¯] is mean-square stable, where A¯ = A − BΥ†(BTP +
DTPC), and C¯ = C −DΥ†(BTP +DTPC);
(ii) (26) admits a unique solution Π such that A + G −
BΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC) is Hurwitz;
(iii) (27)-(28) admits a set of unique solutions s, x¯ ∈
L2([0,∞),Rn);
(iv) R
(
BTP +DTPC
)
∪R(BT (Π−P )) ⊆ R(Υ), BT s+
DTPσ ∈ R(Υ).
Proof. Applying Theorem 2 in [26], we obtain that under
A4)-A5), (25) admits a unique solution P such that the system
[A¯, C¯] is mean-square stable. Note that in (26), P is known.
Since (A+G,B) is stabilizable, then from [26, Theorem 2],
(26) admits a unique solutionΠ such that A+G−BΥ†(BTΠ+
DTPC) is Hurwitz. From an argument in [43, Appendix A],
we obtain s ∈ L2([0,∞),Rn) if and only if
s(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−[A+G−BΥ
†(BTΠ+DTPC)](t−τ)
× (Πf + C¯Pσ − η¯)dτ.
From the argument in [26, Theorem 1], one can show that
(BT s + DTPσ)T (I − ΥΥ†) = 0, which implies BT s +
DTPσ ∈ R(Υ). Similarly, we have R
(
BTP + DTPC
)
∪
R(BTK) ⊆ R(Υ). 
We now introduce an additional assumption. Later, the
assumption is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the
uniform stabilization of all the subsystems.
A6) A¯+G is Hurwitz, where A¯=A−BΥ†(BTP+DTPC).
It is shown that the decentralized control laws (21) uni-
formly stabilize all the subsystems in (1).
Theorem 4.1: Let A1), A4)-A6) hold. Then there exists an
N0 such that for N ≥ N0, the following hold:
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ ∞
0
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞. (31)
E
∫ ∞
0
‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt = O( 1
N
). (32)
Proof. After the control (24) is applied, we have
dxˆi =
[
A¯xˆi +Gxˆ
(N) + f¯
]
dt+ [C¯xˆi + σ¯]dWi, (33)
where f¯
∆
= f − BΥ†(BT (Kx¯ + s) +DTPσ), and σ¯ ∆= σ −
DΥ†(BT (Kx¯+s)+DTPσ). Let ξ(t) = xˆ(N)(t)−x¯(t). From
(33) and (28),
ξ(t) = e(A¯+G)tξ(0) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−τ)(C¯xˆi + σ¯)dWi.
Thus, we have
E
∫ T
0
(
‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2
)
dt
≤ 2E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G)t∥∥∥2 ∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)∥∥2dt
+2E
∫ T
0
1
N
∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−τ)(C¯xˆi + σ¯)dWi(τ)
∥∥∥∥
2
dt
≤ 2
∫ T
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G)t∥∥∥2 E∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)∥∥2dt
+
2
N
E
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G)(t−τ)∥∥∥2 ‖C¯xˆi + σ¯‖2dτdt
≤ 2
N
∫ T
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G)t∥∥∥2 max
1≤i≤N
E
∥∥xˆi(0)∥∥2dt
+
c
N
E
∫ T
0
(c1‖xˆi‖2 + c2)
∫ T
τ
∥∥e(A¯+G)(t−τ)∥∥2dtdτ
≤ c1
N
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ T
0
‖xˆi‖2dt+ c1
N
. (34)
Let P satisfy PA¯ + A¯TP + C¯TPC¯ = −2I. From Lemma
4.1(i) and [35], we have P > 0. By Itoˆ’s formula and (33),
E[xˆTi (T )P xˆi(T )− xˆTi (0)P xˆi(0)]
=E
∫ T
0
[
xˆTi P (A¯xˆi +Gxˆ
(N) + f¯)
+ (A¯xˆi +Gxˆ
(N) + f¯)TP xˆi
]
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
(C¯xˆi + σ¯)
TP (C¯xˆi + σ¯)dt. (35)
From (35), we have
E[xˆTi (T )P xˆi(T )− xˆTi (0)P xˆi(0)]
=E
∫ T
0
[
xˆTi (PA¯+ A¯
TP + C¯TPC¯)xˆi
+ (xˆ(N))T (PG+GTP )xˆ(N)
+ 2(P f¯ + C¯TP σ¯)T xˆi + σ¯
TP σ¯
]
dt
≤E
∫ T
0
[
xˆTi (PA¯+ A¯
TP + C¯TPC¯)xˆi + ‖xˆi‖2
+ (xˆ(N))T (PG+GTP )xˆ(N)
+ ‖P f¯ + C¯TP σ¯‖2 + σ¯TP σ¯]dt
≤− E
∫ T
0
(xˆTi xˆi)dt+ αT , (36)
where
αT =E
∫ T
0
[
(xˆ(N))T (PG+GTP )xˆ(N)
+ ‖P f¯ + C¯TP σ¯‖2 + σ¯TP σ¯]dt.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES 8
This with (34) gives
E
∫ T
0
‖xˆi‖2dt ≤ E[xTi0Pxi0] + αT
≤c2E
∫ T
0
‖x(N)‖2dt+ c2
≤2c2E
∫ T
0
(‖x¯(t)‖2 + ‖ξ(t)‖2)dt+ c2
≤2c2
[
E
∫ T
0
‖x¯(t)‖2dt+ c1
N
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ T
0
‖xˆi‖2dt
]
+
2c1c2
N
+ c2. (37)
Thus, there exists N0 such that for any N > N0,
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ T
0
‖xˆi‖2dt ≤ 2c2E
∫ T
0
‖x¯(t)‖2dt+ 2c1c2 + c2.
Note x¯ ∈ L2([0,∞),Rn). We have
max
1≤i≤N
E
∫ ∞
0
‖xˆi‖2dt ≤ c.
This together with (34) gives (32). 
We now give two equivalent conditions for uniform stabi-
lization of all the subsystems.
Theorem 4.2: For (P0), let A5) hold. Assume that (25)-
(26) have symmetric solutions. Then for (P0) the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) there exists an N0 such that for N ≥ N0 and any initial
condition (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞; (38)
(ii) (25)-(27) admit symmetric solutions such that R +
DTPD ≥ 0, R
(
BTP + DTPC
)
∪ R(BT (Π − P )) ⊆
R(Υ), BT s+DTPσ ∈ R(Υ), and A¯+G is Hurwitz;
(iii) A4) and A6) hold.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
For the case Q ≥ 0, R > 0, when the assumption A5)
is strengthened to A5)′, we can give the following equivalent
conditions for uniform stabilization of the systems.
A5
′) Q ≥ 0, R > 0, [A,C,√Q] is exactly observable, and
(A+G,
√
Q(I − Γ)) is observable.
Theorem 4.3: Let A5′) hold. Assume that (25)-(26) have
symmetric solutions. Then for (P0) the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) For any initial condition (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfying
A1), the following holds,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞;
(ii) (25) and (26) admit unique solutions such that P > 0,Π >
0, and A¯+G is Hurwitz;
(iii) A4) and A6) hold.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Remark 4.2: In [33], some similar results were given for
the stabilization of mean field systems. However, only the
limiting problem was considered in their work and the mean
field term in dynamics and costs is Ex(t) instead of x(N)(t).
Here we study large-population multiagent systems and the
number of agents is large but not infinite. The errors of mean
field approximations need to be further analyzed. In this case,
an additional assumption A6) is needed to obtain uniform
stabilization.
To compare the optimal social costs under decentralized and
centralized strategies, we need the presumption that Problem
(P0) admits a centralized solution. Thus, we set an assumption
on the following generalized Riccati equation:
A7) The equation
Aˇ
T
P+ PAˇ+
N∑
i=1
CTi PCi + Q¯−
(
BTP+
N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)T
×Υ†
(
BTP+
N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)
= 0
admits a solution such that Υ = R +
∑N
i=1D
T
i PDi ≥ 0,
R
(
BTP+
∑N
i=1 D
T
i PCi
)
⊆ R(Υ) and the following system
is mean-square stable:
dx =
[
Aˇ− BΥ†
(
BTP+
N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)]
xdt
+
N∑
i=1
[
Ci − DiΥ†
(
BTP+
N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)]
dWi.
B. Asymptotic social optimality
We now are in a position to state the asymptotic social
optimality of the decentralized control.
Theorem 4.4: Let A1), A4)-A7) hold. For Problem (P0),
the set of decentralized control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} given by
(24) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,
∣∣∣ 1
N
Jsoc(uˆ)− 1
N
inf
u∈Uc
Jsoc(u)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
).
We first provide a primary lemma, which plays an important
role in establishing the asymptotic optimality result.
Lemma 4.2: For the system (29), assume [A,B;C,D] is
stabilizable. Then for any u ∈ L2([0,∞),Rn) and a stabilizer
Ky, there exist constants αi, ci > 0, i = 1, 2 such that
E
∫ ∞
0
‖y(t)‖2dt ≤ α1E
∫ ∞
0
‖u(t)−Ky(t)‖2dt+ c1,
E
∫ ∞
0
‖u(t)‖2dt ≤ α2E
∫ ∞
0
‖u(t)−Ky(t)‖2dt+ c2.
Proof. Define u∗ = u − Ky, where y satisfies (29). Then
u∗ ∈ L2([0,∞),Rn) and y satisfies
dy(t) =[(A+BK)y(t) +Bu∗(t)]dt
+ [(C +DK)y(t) +Du∗(t)]dW (t), y(0) = y0.
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SinceKy is a stabilizer, then by [38], there exists a constant α1
such that E
∫∞
0
‖y(t)‖2dt ≤ α1E
∫∞
0
‖u∗(t)‖2dt+ c1. Hence,
E
∫ ∞
0
‖u(t)‖2dt =E
∫ ∞
0
‖u∗(t) +Ky(t)‖2dt
≤α2E
∫ ∞
0
‖u∗(t)‖2dt+ c2
=α2E
∫ ∞
0
‖u(t)−Ky(t)‖2dt+ c2,
where α2 = 2α1‖K‖2 + 2, and c2 = 2c1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We first prove that for u ∈ Uc,
Jsoc(u) < c1 implies that there exists a constant c2 such that
E
∫ ∞
0
(‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2)dt < c2, (39)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . From A7), the following equation admits
a unique solution s ∈ L2([0,∞),RNn),
s˙+
[
Aˇ−
N∑
i=1
BΥ†
(
BTP+ DTi PCi
)]T
s+ P(f ⊗ 1)
+
N∑
i=1
[
Ci − DiΥ†
(
BTP+ DTi PCi
)]T
Pσi − η¯ ⊗ 1 = 0.
By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
Jsoc(u) = lim sup
T→∞
E
[
xT (0)Px(0)− xT (T )Px(T )]
+ E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥u+Υ†[(BTP+ N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)
x
+ BT s+
N∑
i=1
DTi Pσi
]∥∥∥2dt
≥ E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥u+Υ†(BTP+ N∑
i=1
DTi PCi
)
x
∥∥∥2dt− c.
By Lemma 4.2, there exist constants α, c > 0 such that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
(‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2)dt
≤αE
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥u+Υ†(BTP+ N∑
i=1
DTi PCi)x
∥∥∥2dt+ c
≤αJsoc(u) + c ≤ c2. (40)
By a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 3.2 combined
with Theorem 4.1, the conclusion follows. 
Remark 4.3: In [20], authors studied Problem (P) in the
case Q ≥ 0, G = C = 0 and D = 0 by the fixed-
point approach with person-by-person optimality. It is shown
in Theorem 4.3 that the Social Certainty Equivalence sys-
tem (fixed-point equation) admits a unique solution, when
(A − (ρ/2)I,√Q) is detectable and QΓ ≤ 0. In fact, the
assumption above is merely a sufficient condition to ensure
that A− (ρ/2)I,√Q−QΓ is detectable, which implies A5).
Besides, from Theorem 4.3 of [20] and Theorem 4.4 of this
paper, the decentralized control in (24) is a representation of
the decentralized control derived by the fixed-point approach
(see e.g., [4, Definition 5.11] for the definition of a represen-
tation). Both approaches lead to the same state trajectory and
mean field equation. See Section 5 of [39] for more details.
V. ASYMPTOTICALLY SOCIAL OPTIMAL COST
We now give an explicit expression of the asymptotic social
optimum in terms of solutions to two Riccati equations.
Theorem 5.1: Assume i) A1), A4-A7) hold; ii) {xi0} have
the same variance. Then the asymptotic average social opti-
mum is given by
lim
N→∞
1
N
Jsoc(uˆ) = E
[
(xi0 − x¯0)TP (xi0 − x¯0)
+ x¯T0 Πx¯0 + 2s
T (0)x¯0
]
+m,
where P and Π are given by (25)-(26), respectively, and
m =
∫ ∞
0
[‖σ(t)‖2P + ‖σ(t)‖2Π − ‖BT s(t) +DTPσ(t)‖2Υ†
+ 2sT (t)f(t) + ‖η(t)‖2Q
]
dt.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we need two lemmas.
Consider a mean-field-type system
dzi =(Azi +Bui +GE[zi] + f)dt
+ (Czi +Dui + σ)dWi, zi(0) = xi0, (41)
with the cost function
Ji(ui) = E
∫ ∞
0
(‖zi − ΓE[zi]− η‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R)dt. (42)
The admissible control set is given by
Ui =
{
ui
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to σ(zi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t),
E
∫ ∞
0
‖zi(t)‖2dt <∞, ∀i
}
.
Lemma 5.1: For the system (41)-(42), the optimal control
is given by
uˆi =−Υ†[(BTP +DTPC)zi
+BT (Π− P )E[zi] +BT s+DTPσ],
(43)
and the optimal cost is
inf
ui∈Ui
Ji(ui) =E
[
(xi0 − x¯0)TP (xi0 − x¯0)
+ x¯T0 Πx¯0 + 2s
T (0)x¯0
]
+m.
Proof. From (41),
dE[zi] = [(A+G)E[zi]+BE[ui]+f ]dt, E[zi](0) = xi0. (44)
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Applying Itoˆ’s formula to ‖zi − E[zi]‖2P , we have
E
[‖zi(T )− E[zi(T )]‖2P − ‖xi0 − x¯0‖2P ]
=E
∫ T
0
{
2
〈
zi − E[zi], P [A(zi − E[zi]) +B(ui − E[ui])
〉
+ ‖Czi +Dui + σ‖2P
}
dt
=E
∫ T
0
{〈
(ATP + PA+ CTPC)(zi − E[zi]), zi − E[zi]
〉
+ 2
〈
(BTP +DTPC)(zi − E[zi]), ui − E[ui]
〉
+
〈
ui − E[ui], DTPD(ui − E[ui])
〉
+
〈
E[ui], D
TPDE[ui]
〉
+
〈
(CTPC + 2CTPσ)E[zi],E[zi]
〉
+ 2
〈
DTPCE[zi] +D
TPσ,E[ui]
〉}
dt. (45)
From (24) and (44),
E[zi(T )]
TΠE[zi(T )]− x¯T0 Πx¯0
=E
∫ T
0
{〈[(A +G)TΠ+Π(A +G)]E[zi],E[zi]〉
+ 2〈BTΠE[zi],E[ui]〉+ 2〈Πf,E[zi]〉
}
dt. (46)
Also, applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈s,E[zi]〉, we have
E[zi(T )]
T s(T )− x¯T0 s(0)
=E
∫ T
0
{
〈−[A+G−BΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)]T s,E[zi]〉
− 〈[C −DΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)]TPσ +Πf − η¯,E[zi]〉}
+ 〈(A+G)E[zi] +BE[ui] + f, s〉
}
dt
=E
∫ T
0
{〈
(ΠB + CTPD)Υ†(BT s+DTPσ),E[zi]
〉
+ 〈s, f〉
− 〈CTPσ +Πf − η¯,E[zi]〉+ 〈BT s,E[ui]〉
}
dt. (47)
Denote Ψ
∆
= BTP +DTPC. By (45)-(47), we obtain
Ji(ui)
=E
∫ ∞
0
[
‖zi − E[zi]‖2Q + ‖(I − Γ)E[zi]‖2Q − 2η¯TE[zi]
+ ‖η‖2Q + ‖ui − E[ui]‖2R + ‖E[ui]‖2R
]
dt
=E
[‖xi0 − x¯0‖2P + x¯T0 Πx¯0 + 2sT (0)x¯0]
− lim
T→∞
E
[‖zi(T )− E[zi(T )]‖2P + E[zi(T )]TΠE[zi(T )]
+ 2zi(T )
T s(T )
]
+ E
∫ ∞
0
[
〈ΨTΥ†Ψ(zi − E[zi]), zi − E[zi]
〉
+ 2〈Ψ, zi − E[zi]〉+ 〈Υ(ui−E[ui]), ui−E[ui]〉
+ 〈(BTΠ+DTPC)TΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)E[zi],E[zi]〉
+ 2〈(BTΠ+DTPC)E[zi] +BT s+DTPσ,E[ui]〉
+ 〈(BTΠ+DTPC)TΥ†(BT s+DTPσ),E[zi]〉
+ 〈ΥE[ui],E[ui]〉+ 2〈s, f〉+ 〈Pσ, σ〉 + 〈Qη, η〉
]
dt
=E
[‖xi0 − x¯0‖2P + x¯T0 Πx¯0 + 2sT (0)x¯0]+m
+ E
∫ ∞
0
[∥∥ui − E[ui] + Υ†Ψ(zi − E[zi])∥∥2Υ + ∥∥E[ui]
+ Υ†(BTΠ+DTPC)E[zi] +BT s+DTPσ
∥∥2
Υ
]
dt
≥E[‖xi0 − x¯0‖2P + x¯T0 Πx¯0 + 2sT (0)x¯0]+m.

Lemma 5.2: Let A1), A4)-A7) hold. Then
E
∫ ∞
0
‖xˆi − zˆi‖2dt = O
( 1
N
)
,
where zˆi is the closed-loop state of zi in (41).
Proof. After applying the control (43) into the dynamics
(41), we have
dzˆi =
[
Azˆi−BΥ†[(BTP+DTPC)zˆi+BT (Π−P )E[zˆi]
+BT s+DTPσ] +GE[zˆi] + f
]
dt
+
[
Czˆi−DΥ†[(BTP+DTPC)zˆi+BT (Π−P )E[zˆi]
+BT s+DTPσ] + σ
]
dWi,
which leads to
dE[zˆi] = [(A+G− (BΥ†BTΠ+DTPC))E[zˆi] + f ]dt,
E[zˆi(0)] = x¯0.
By comparing this with (28), we can verify that E[zˆi] = x¯.
From (33),
d(xˆi − zˆi) =A¯(xˆi − zˆi)dt+G(xˆ(N) − E[zˆi])dt
+ C¯(xˆi − zˆi)dWi.
This implies
xˆi(t)− zˆi(t) =
∫ t
0
Φi(t− τ)G[xˆ(N)(τ) − E[zˆi(τ)]]dτ,
where Φi satisfies
dΦi(t) = A¯Φi(t)dt + C¯Φi(t)dWi, Φi(t) = I.
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By Schwarz’s inequality and Theorem 4.1,
E
∫ ∞
0
‖xˆi(t)− zˆi(t)‖2dt
=E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥∫ t
0
Φi(t− τ)G(xˆ(N)(τ)− E[zˆi(τ)])dτ
∥∥∥2dt
≤E
∫ ∞
0
t
∫ t
0
∥∥Φi(t− τ)‖2‖G(xˆ(N)(τ) − E[zˆi(τ)])∥∥2dτdt
=E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥G(xˆ(N)(τ)− E[zˆi(τ)])∥∥2
∫ ∞
τ
t‖Φi(t− τ)‖2dtdτ
≤cE
∫ ∞
0
∥∥xˆ(N)(τ) − E[zˆi(τ)]∥∥2dτ = O( 1
N
).

Proof of Theorem 5.1. Note that E[zˆi] = x¯. We have
1
N
Jsoc(uˆ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
[
‖xˆi − Γxˆ(N) + η)‖2Q
+ ‖Υ†[(BTP +DTPC)xˆi
+BT (Π− P )x¯+BT s+DTPσ]‖2R
]
dt
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
[
‖zˆi − Γ(E[zˆi] + η)
+ xˆi − zˆi + Γxˆ(N) − ΓE[zˆi]‖2Qdt
+ ‖Υ†[(BTP +DTPC)(zˆi + xˆi − zˆi)
+BT (Π− P )E[zˆi] +BT s+DTPσ]‖2R
]
dt.
By Schwarz’s inequality, and Lemma 5.2, one can obtain
| 1
N
Jsoc(uˆ)− 1
N
Jsoc(uˆ)|
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
[‖xˆi − zˆi‖2Q + ‖Γ(xˆ(N) − E[zˆi])‖2Q]dt
+
c1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
∫ ∞
0
‖xˆi − zˆi‖2Qdt
)1/2
+
c2
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
∫ ∞
0
‖Γ(xˆ(N) − E[zˆi])‖2Qdt
)1/2
≤ O(1/
√
N).
From this and Lemma 5.1, the theorem follows. 
Remark 5.1: The mean-field-type control problem (see
e.g., [13], [48]) is a closely related problem to the mean
field social control. The setups of both problems are different.
The mean field social control is multi-agent optimization, and
there are a large number of agents with their own states and
controls. In contrast, the mean field type control is single-
agent optimization. When the control ui is perturbed with
δui, the alteration magnitude of E[zi] is O(‖δui‖), while the
changing magnitude of x(N) is O(‖δui‖/N). However, the
optimal solutions of both problems coincide for the infinite
population case. By the discussion in this section, the solutions
(24) and (43) of both problems are asymptotically equivalent
in some sense.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, a numerical example is given to illustrate
the effectiveness of the proposed decentralized control laws.
We consider a scalar system with 50 agents in Problem
(P0). Take A = 0.1, B = C = D = Q = 1, R = −0.2, G =
−0.1, f = e−t, η = 1t+1 , σ = 0.1, and Γ = −0.2. The initial
states of 50 agents are taken independently from a normal
distribution N(1, 0.1). The Riccaiti equations (25)-(26) admit
solutions P = 0.6808 and Π = 0.3290, respectively. Then,
under the control law (24), the state trajectories of agents
are shown in Fig. 1. After the transient phase, the states of
agents achieve an agreement. The trajectories of x¯ and xˆ(N)
in (P0) are shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen that x¯ and xˆ(N)
coincide well, which illustrates the consistency of mean field
approximations.
0 2 4 6 8
time
0
1
2
3
4
st
at
es
Fig. 1: Curves of 30 agents.
0 2 4 6 8
time
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
xˆ
(N )
x¯
Fig. 2: Curves of xˆ(N) and x¯.
The cost gap ε between centralized and decentralized opti-
mal controls is demonstrated in Fig. 3 where the agent number
N grows from 1 to 50.
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Fig. 3: Curves of ε with respect to N .
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have considered uniform stabilization
and asymptotic optimality for indefinite mean field LQ social
control systems with multiplicative noises. By decoupling
FBSDEs, we design the decentralized control laws, which are
further shown to be asymptotically optimal. Some equivalent
conditions are further given for uniform stabilization of all the
subsystems.
The interesting generalization is to consider mean field LQ
control systems with common noise by handling FBSDEs.
Also, the variational analysis may be applied to leader-follower
models to construct decentralized social control.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) Suppose that {uˇi, i = 1, · · · , N}
is an optimal control for Problem (P1). Denote by xˇi the
state of agent i under the optimal control uˇi. For any ui ∈
L2F(0, T ;R
r) and θ ∈ R (θ 6= 0), let uθi = uˇi + θui. Denote
by xθi the solution of the following perturbed state equation
dxθi =
(
Axθi +B(uˇi + θui) +
G
N
N∑
i=1
xθi + f
)
dt
+ (Cxθi +Du
θ
i + σ)dWi,
xθi (0) =xi0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Let yi = (x
θ
i − xˇi)/θ. It can be verified that yi satisfies (5).
Let {pi, βji , i, j = 1, · · · , N} be a set of solutions to (7). Then
by Itoˆ’s formula, for any i = 1, · · · , N ,
N∑
i=1
E[〈Hxi −HΓ0x(N) − η¯0, yi(T )〉]
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈AT pi + CTβii −Qxˇi −QΓxˇ(N) − η¯
+GT p(N), yi〉+ 〈pi, Ayi +Gy(N) +Bui〉
+ 〈βii , Cyi +Dui〉
]
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈−(Qxˇi +QΓxˇ(N) + η¯), yi〉
+ 〈BT pi +DTβii , ui〉
]
dt. (A.1)
From (4), we have
JˇFsoc(uˇ+ θu)− JˇFsoc(uˇ) = 2θI1 + θ2I2 (A.2)
where uˇ = (uˇ1, · · · , uˇN ), and
I1
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
[〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yi − Γy(N)
〉
+ 〈Ruˇi, ui〉
]
dt+
〈
H
(
xˇi(T )− (Γ0xˇ(N)(T ) + η0)
)
,
yi(T )− Γ0y(N)(T )
〉}
,
I2
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[∥∥yi − Γy(N)∥∥2Q + ‖ui‖2R]dt
+
N∑
i=1
E‖yi(T )− Γ0y(N)(T )‖2H .
Note that
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
,Γy(N)
〉
dt
+
〈
H
(
xˇi(T )− (Γ0xˇ(N)(T ) + η0)
)
,Γ0y
(N)(T )
〉}
=
N∑
j=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈ΓTQ
N
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yj
〉
dt
+
〈ΓT0H
N
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi(T )− (Γ0xˇ(N)(T ) + η0)
)
, yj(T )
〉}
=
N∑
j=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈
ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η), yj〉dt
+
〈
ΓT0H
(
(I − Γ0)xˇ(N)(T )− η0
)
, yj(T )
〉}
.
From (A.1), one can obtain that
I1 =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yi − Γy(N)
〉
+ 〈Ruˇi +BT pi +DTβii , ui〉
]
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
[〈
H
(
xˇi(T )− (Γ0xˇ(N)(T ) + η0)
)
,
yi(T )− Γ0y(N)(T )
〉− 〈Hxi−HΓ0x(N)−η¯0, yi(T )〉]
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈−(Qxˇi +QΓxˇ(N) + η¯), yi〉dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈
Ruˇi +B
T pi +D
Tβii , ui
〉
dt. (A.3)
From (A.2), uˇ = (uˇ1, · · · , uˇN) is an optimal control of
Problem (P1) if and only if I2 ≥ 0 and I1 = 0. Indeed, if
I2 ≥ 0 does not hold, then the minimization problem is ill-
posed (See e.g., [37]). By Proposition 3.1, I2 ≥ 0 if and only
if (P1) is convex. By (A.3), I1 = 0 is equivalent to
Ruˇi +B
T pi +D
Tβii = 0.
Thus, we have the following optimality system (7), which
implies that FBSDE (7) admits a solution (xˇi, pˇi, βˇ
j
i , i, j =
1, · · · , N).
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES 13
On other hand, if the equation system (7) admits a solution
(xˇi, pˇi, βˇ
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N). Let uˇi satisfy Ruˇi + BT pˇi +
DT βˇii = 0. If (P1) is convex, then by (A.2), uˇ is an optimal
control to Problem (P1).
(ii) By Proposition 3.2, the fact that (P1) is uniformly
convex implies (6) admits a solution. This with [49] further
gives FBSDE (7) admits a solution. Thus, (ii) follows. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREMS 3.2
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need two lemmas.
Lemma B.1: Let A1)-A3) hold. Under the control (21), we
have
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆi(t)‖2 ≤ c. (B.1)
Proof. Let Φi(t) is the solution to the following stochastic
differential equation:
dΦi(t) = A¯(t)Φi(t)dt+C¯(t)Φi(t)dWi(t), Φi(0) = I. (B.2)
Note that Φi is invertible [49]. From (23), we have
xˆi(t)=Φi(t)xi0 +
∫ t
0
Φi(t, τ)(Gx
(N)(τ) + g(τ))dτ
+
∫ t
0
Φi(t, τ)σ(τ)dWi(τ),
where Φi(t, τ)
∆
= Φi(t)Φ
−1
i (τ), and
g
∆
= (C¯TD −B)Υ†BT (Kx¯+ s) + f − C¯Tσ.
It can be verified that
∫ T
0 ‖g(t)‖2dt ≤ c. Note that
E
∫ T
0
tr[ΦTi (t)Φi(t)]dt < c. We have
E‖xˆi(t)‖2
≤3E‖Φi(t)xi0‖2 + 3E
∫ t
0
tr
[
ΦTi (t, τ)σ
T σΦi(t, τ)
]
dτ
+ 3E
∫ t
0
tr[ΦTi (t, τ)Φi(t, τ)]dτ
× E
∫ t
0
‖Gxˆ(N)(τ) + g(τ)‖2dτ
≤c0 + 6c1
(
c2E
∫ t
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖xˆi(τ)‖2dτ + c3
)
≤6c1c2
∫ t
0
max
1≤i≤N
E‖xˆi(τ)‖2dτ + c.
By Gronwall’s inequality, max1≤i≤N E‖xˆi(t)‖2 ≤ ce6c1c2t.
This implies (B.1). 
Lemma B.2: Let A1)-A3) hold. Under the control (21), we
have
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2 = O( 1
N
). (B.3)
Proof. It follows by (23) that
dxˆ(N) =
[
(A¯+G)xˆ(N) −BΥ†BT (Υx¯+ s) + f]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
[C¯xˆi −DΥ†BT (Kx¯+ s) + σ]dWi.
From this and (20), we have
d(xˆ(N) − x¯) = (A¯+G)(xˆ(N) − x¯)dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
[C¯xˆi −DΥ†BT (Kx¯+ s) + σ]dWi,
which leads to
xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t) = e(A¯+G)t[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)]
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−τ)[C¯xˆi
−DΥ†BT (Kx¯+ s) + σ]dWi(τ).
(B.4)
By A1), one can obtain
E
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2
≤ 2∥∥e(A¯+G)t∥∥2{E∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯0∥∥2
+
1
N
∫ t
0
∥∥e−(A¯+G)(t−τ)∥∥2(c1E‖xˆi‖2 + c2)dτ}
≤ 2
N
∥∥e(A¯+G)t∥∥2{ max
1≤i≤N
E‖xˆi0‖2
+ c
∫ t
0
∥∥e−(A¯+G)(t−τ)∥∥2]dτ},
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We first prove that for u ∈ Uc,
JFsoc(u) < ∞ implies that E
∫ T
0 (‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2)dt < ∞, for
all i = 1, · · · , N . By A2), we have
δ0
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
‖ui‖2dt− c ≤ JFsoc(u) <∞,
which implies
∑N
i=1 E
∫ T
0 ‖ui‖2dt < c1. By (1) and
Schwarz’s inequality,
E‖xi(t)‖2 ≤ c1E
∫ t
0
‖x(N)(τ)‖2dτ + c2,
≤c1
N
E
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
‖xj(τ)‖2dτ + c2
which further gives that
N∑
j=1
E‖xj(t)‖2 ≤ c1
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
E‖xj(τ)‖2dτ +Nc2.
By Gronwall’s inequality,
N∑
j=1
E‖xj(t)‖2 ≤ Nc2ec1t ≤ Nc2ec1T .
Let x˜i = xi − xˆi, u˜i = ui − uˆi and x˜(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x˜i. Note
that it follows by Lemma B.1 that
E
∫ T
0
(‖xˆi‖2 + ‖uˆi‖2)dt <∞.
Then we have
E
∫ T
0
(‖x˜i‖2 + ‖u˜i‖2)dt <∞. (B.5)
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By (1) and (23),
dx˜i = (Ax˜i+Gx˜
(N)+Bu˜i)dt+(Cx˜i+Du˜i)dWi, x˜i(0) = 0.
(B.6)
From (4), we have JFsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1(J
F
i (uˆ) + J˜
F
i (u˜) + 2Iˆi),
where
J˜Fi (u˜)
∆
= E
∫ T
0
[‖x˜i − Γx˜(N)‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2R]dt,
+ E[‖x˜i(T )− Γ0(x˜(N)(T ))‖2H ]
Iˆi=E
{∫ T
0
[(
xˆi−Γxˆ(N)−η
)T
Q
(
x˜i−Γx˜(N)
)
+uˆTi Ru˜i
]
dt
+
[
xˆi(T )−(Γ0xˆ(N)(T ) + η0)
]T
H [x˜i(T )− Γ0x˜(N)(T )]
}
.
By A2), J˜Fi (u˜) ≥ 0. We now prove 1N
∑N
i=1 Iˆi = O(
1√
N
).
N∑
i=1
Iˆi =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
x˜Ti
(
Qxˆi −QΓx¯− η¯
)
+ uˆTi Ru˜i
}
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
(xˆ(N) − x¯)TQΓx˜idt
+
N∑
i=1
E
[
x˜Ti (T )(Hxˆi(T )−HΓ0 x¯(T )− η¯0)
+ (xˆ(N)(T )− x¯(T ))THΓ0 x˜i(T )
]
.
(B.7)
Denote pˆi(t) = P xˆi(t)+Kx¯(t)+s(t). Then by (16)-(18) and
Itoˆ’s formula,
dpˆi =−
[
ATP + PA+ CTPC+Q− (BTP +DTPC)T
×Υ†(BTP +DTPC)]xˆidt+ P [A¯xˆi −BΥ†(BT
× (Kx¯+ s) +DTPσ) +Gxˆ(N) + f]dt+ P [C¯xˆi
−DΥ†(BT (Kx¯+ s) +DTPσ) + σ]dWi
− [(A+G)TK +K(A+G)− (BTP +DTPC)T
×Υ†BTK −KBΥ†BTK +GTP + PG−KBΥ†
× (BTP +DTPC)−QΓ
]
x¯dt+K
{
(A+G)x¯
−BΥ†[BT (P +K) +DTPC]x¯−BΥ†(BT s
+DTPσ) + f
}
dt−
{[
A+G−BΥ†(B(P +K)
+DTPC
)]T
s+ (P +K)f +
[
C
−DΥ†N
(
B(P +K) +DTPC
)]T
Pσ − η¯
}
=− (AT pˆi +GT pˆ(N) + CT βˆii +Qxˆi −QΓx¯− η¯)dt
+ (GTP + PG)(xˆ(N) − x¯)dt+ βˆiidWi,
(B.8)
where βˆii = P (Cxˆi + Duˆi + σ). By (21), we have Ruˆi =
−(Bpˆi +Dβˆii). Note that pˆi(T ) = Hxˆi(T )−HΓ0 x¯(T )− η¯0.
From (B.6) and (B.8),
N∑
i=1
E
[
x˜Ti (T )(Hxˆi(T )−HΓ0 x¯(T )− η¯0)
]
= E
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
{
− x˜Ti
[
Qxˆi −QΓx¯− η¯
]− uˆTi Ru˜i}dt
+NE
∫ T
0
(xˆ(N) − x¯)T (GTP + PG)x˜(N)dt.
This and (B.7) lead to
1
N
N∑
i=1
Iˆi =E
∫ T
0
(xˆ(N)− x¯)T (QΓ+GTP+PG)x˜(N)dt
+ E[(xˆ(N)(T )− x¯(T ))THΓ0 x˜(N)(T )
]
.
By Lemma B.2, and (B.5), we obtain
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Iˆi
∣∣∣2 ≤cE∫ T
0
‖xˆ(N) − x¯‖2dt · E
∫ T
0
‖x˜(N)‖2dt
× E[‖xˆ(N)(T )− x¯(T ))‖2 · E‖x˜(N)(T )‖2,
which implies | 1N
∑N
i=1 Iˆi| = O(1/
√
N). 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREMS 4.2 AND 4.3
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (iii)⇒(i) was given in Theorem 4.1.
We now prove (i)⇒(iii). By (33),
dE[xˆi]
dt
= A¯E[xˆi]−BΥ†BT ((Π− P )x¯+ s)
+GE[xˆ(N)] + f, E[xˆi(0)] = x¯0.
(C.1)
It follows from A1) that
E[xˆi] = E[xˆj ] = E[xˆ
(N)], j 6= i.
By comparing (28) and (C.1), we obtain
d(E[xˆi]− x¯)
dt
= (A¯+G)(E[xˆi]− x¯), E[xˆi(0)]− x¯(0) = 0,
which implies
E[xˆi] = x¯ = E[xˆ
(N)]. (C.2)
Note that ‖x¯‖2 ≤ E‖xˆi‖2. It follows from (38) that∫ ∞
0
‖x¯(t)‖2dt <∞. (C.3)
By (28), we have
x¯(t) =e[A+G−BΥ
†(BTΠ+DTPC)]t
[
x¯0
+
∫ t
0
e−(A+G−BΥ
†BTΠ)τh(τ)dτ
]
,
where h = −BΥ†(BT s+DTPσ)+f . By the arbitrariness of
x¯0 with (C.3) we obtain that A+G−BΥ†(BTΠ+DTPC)
is Hurwitz. That is, (A + G,B) is stabilizable. Note that
E[x(N)]2 ≤ 1N
∑N
i=1 E[xˆ
2
i ]. Then from (38) we have
E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)∥∥2dt <∞. (C.4)
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This leads to E
∫∞
0
‖k(t)‖2dt < ∞, where k= −
BΥ†[BT ((Π − P )x¯ + s) + DTPσ] + Gxˆ(N) + f . By (33),
we obtain
E‖xˆi(t)‖2 = E
∥∥∥∥Φi(t)
(
xi0 +
∫ t
0
Φ−1i (τ)k(τ)dτ
)∥∥∥∥
2
,
where Φi satisfies (B.2). By (38) and the arbitrariness of xi0
we obtain that E
∫∞
0
‖Φi(t)‖2 dt < ∞, i.e., [A,B;C,D] is
stabilizable. From (C.3) and (C.4),
E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2dt <∞. (C.5)
On the other hand, (33) and (28) gives
E
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2
= E
∥∥e(A¯+G)t[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯0]∥∥2
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ t
0
∥∥e(A¯+G)(t−τ)(C¯xˆi(τ) + σ¯(τ)∥∥2dτ.
By (C.5) and the arbitrariness of xi0, i = 1, · · · , N , we obtain
that A¯+G is Hurwitz.
(iii)⇒(ii) was given in Lemma 4.1. (ii)⇒(iii) was implied
from [26, Theorem 2]. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. (iii)⇒(i) has been proved in Theorem
4.1. Following (i)⇒(iii) of Theorem 4.2, together with [2],
[52], we obtain (i)⇒ (ii).
(ii)⇒(iii). Define V (t) = E[yT (t)Py(t)], where y satisfies
(29). Denote V by V ∗ when u = u∗(t) = −Υ†(BTP +
DTPC)y(t). By (26) we have
V ∗(T )− V ∗(0)
=E
{
yT (t)
[−Q− (BTP+DTPC)TΥ†(BTP+DTPC)
+
(
BTP +DTPC
)T
Υ†(DTPD)
×Υ†(BTP +DTPC)]y(t)}
=E
{
yT (t)
[−Q− (BTP +DTPC)TΥ†RΥ†(
BTP +DTPC
)]
y(t)
} ≤ 0.
Note that V ∗ ≥ 0. Then limt→∞ V ∗(t) exists, which implies
lim
t0→∞
[V ∗(t0)− V ∗(t0 + T )] = 0. (C.6)
Rewrite P (t) in (16) by PT (t). Then we have PT+t0(t0) =
PT (0). By (22),
E
∫ T+t0
t0
[yT (t)Qy(t) + uT (t)Ru(t)]dt
= E[yT (t0)PT+t0 (t0)y(t0)]+E
∫ T
0
∥∥u(t)
+ Υ†
(
BTPT+t0(t0) +D
TPT+t0(t0)C
)
y(t)
∥∥2
Υ
dt
≥ E∥∥y(t0)∥∥2PT+t0(t0) = E∥∥y(t0)∥∥2PT (0).
This with (C.6) implies
lim
t0→∞
E
∥∥y(t0)∥∥2PT (0)
≤ lim
t0→∞
E
∫ T+t0
t0
(‖y(t)‖2Q + ‖u∗(t)‖2R)dt
= lim
t0→∞
[V ∗(t0)− V ∗(t0 + T )] = 0.
By A5′), one can obtain that there exists T > 0 such
that PT (0) > 0 (See e.g. [?], [52]). Thus, we have
limt→∞ E
∥∥y¯(t)∥∥2 = 0, which implies [A,B;C,D] is stabi-
lizable.
To show that (A + G,B) is stabilizable, we consider to
optimize
J¯(u) =
∫ T
0
[y¯T (s)(CTPC +Q−QΓ)y¯(s)
+ 2y¯T (s)CTPDu¯(s) + u¯T (s)Υu¯(s)]ds,
where y¯ evolve by
dy¯(t)=
[
(A+G)y¯(t) +Bu¯(t)
]
dt, y¯(0) = y¯0. (C.7)
Let u¯∗(t) = Υ†BTΠ(t)y¯(t), where ΠT (t) satisfies
Π˙ + (A+G)TΠ+Π(A+G)− (BTΠ+DTPC)TΥ†
×(BTΠ+DTPC)+CTPC +Q−QΓ= 0, Π(T ) = 0.
(C.8)
By direct calculations,
y¯T0 ΠT (0)y¯0
=
∫ T
0
[y¯T (s)(CTPC +Q−QΓ)y¯(s)
+ 2y¯T (s)CTPDu¯∗(s) + (u¯∗)T (s)Υu¯∗(s)]ds
=
∫ T
0
[
y¯T (s) (u¯∗)T (s)
]
×
[
Q−QΓ + CTPC CTPD
DTPC Υ
][
y¯(s)
u¯∗(s)
]
ds. (C.9)
Note that[
P PD
D
T
P R+D
T
PD
]
=
[
I 0
D
T
I
][
P 0
0 R
][
I D
0 I
]
.
Thus, we have[
P PD
DTP R+DTPD
]
> 0.
By Schur’s lemma [35], P − PDΥ†DTP ≥ 0. This gives
CT (P −PDΥ†DTP )C ≥ 0. Using Schur’s lemma again, we
obtain [
CTPC CTPD
DTPC Υ
]
≥ 0.
Assume y¯T0 ΠT (0)y¯0 = 0. Then from (C.9), we have∫ T
0 y¯
T (s)(Q − QΓ)y¯(s)dt = 0, which implies (I −
Γ)
√
Qy¯(s) = 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ T . This together with A5′)
gives y¯0 = 0. Hence, we obtain ΠT (0) > 0. By a similar
argument as the above proof, we can obtain the stabilizability
of (A+G,B). 
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